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Religion and Attitudes Toward Same-Sex
Marriage Among U.S. Latinos
Christopher G. Ellison, University of Texas–San Antonio
Gabriel A. Acevedo, University of Texas–San Antonio
Aida I. Ramos-Wada, University of Texas at Austin
Objectives. This study examines links between multiple aspects of religious involvement and attitudes toward same-sex marriage among U.S. Latinos. The primary focus is on variations by affiliation and participation, but the possible
mediating roles of biblical beliefs, clergy cues, and the role of religion in shaping
political views are also considered. Methods. We use binary logistic regression
models to analyze data from a large nationwide sample of U.S. Latinos conducted
by the Pew Hispanic Forum in late 2006. Results. Findings highlight the strong
opposition to same-sex marriage among Latino evangelical (or conservative) Protestants and members of sectarian groups (e.g., LDS), even compared with devout
Catholics. Although each of the hypothesized mediators is significantly linked with
attitudes toward same-sex marriage, for the most part controlling for them does not
alter the massive affiliation/attendance differences in attitudes toward same-sex
marriage. Conclusions. This study illustrates the importance of religious cleavages
in public opinion on social issues within the diverse U.S. Latino population. The
significance of religious variations in Hispanic civic life is likely to increase with the
growth of the Latino population and the rising numbers of Protestants and sectarians among Latinos.

The campaign for equal rights for lesbian-gay-bisexual-transgendered
(LGBT) persons has become one of the most powerful social movements in
the contemporary United States. In contrast to earlier LGBT mobilization,
which centered on nondiscrimination and civil liberties, the current focus of
this movement is the struggle for legalization of same-sex marriage (SSM)
(Rimmerman, Wald, and Wilcox, 2000). To date, however, success on this
front has been uneven. Several states, mostly in the northeastern United
States (along with Iowa), have passed legislation approving SSM, while

others have instituted provisions for ‘‘civil unions’’ that grant certain legal
rights to same-sex partners. On the other hand, more than 40 states have
explicitly prohibited SSM, in most cases amending state constitutions to
define marriage as exclusively the union of a man and a woman, and denying
recognition to SSM conducted in other states where the practice is legal. At
this writing, the struggle continues, with activists mobilizing to overturn
constitutional bans on SSM at the ballot box, while others ponder litigation
at the federal level aimed at achieving recognition of SSM as a civil right
(Rimmerman and Wilcox, 2007).
As these efforts move forward and conflicts intensify, it is useful for
researchers, activists, and policymakers to learn more about the structure of
public opinion concerning SSM. Studies to date have revealed robust
differences in support by age/cohort, education, ideology, and religion (Anderson and Fetner, 2008; Brewer, 2003; Olson, Cadge, and Harrison,
2006). Younger, well-educated, liberal, and secular persons are comparatively supportive of SSM and LGBT rights, including the right to marry.
Opposition to SSM is particularly fierce among highly religious persons,
especially among the members of conservative Protestant and sectarian faith
communities.
However, few researchers have explored the attitudes of Latino/a
Americans on this issue. Such an oversight is noteworthy for several reasons. First, Hispanic Americans have overtaken African Americans as the
largest U.S. minority group. Latinos currently make up at least 14 percent of
the U.S. population, and their numbers continue to increase (Guzman and
McConnell, 2002). Second, despite their Democratic electoral leanings,
Latinos tend to be culturally conservative (Abrajano, Alvarez, and Nagler,
2008; Bolks et al., 2000), and therefore might be presumed to oppose SSM.
Exit polls conducted in California following the passage of an anti-SSM
constitutional amendment (known as Proposition 8) showed that Hispanic
voters closely mirrored the overall state electorate in levels and patterns of
support for this proposition (Haro, 2008). Further, the U.S. Hispanic
population is highly diverse, in terms of nativity status, national origin,
geographical distribution, and many other factors (Guzman and McConnell, 2002). Third, despite the strong Catholic bent of Latinos in general,
U.S. Hispanics also comprise a significant proportion of Protestants, many
of whom are evangelical or charismatic in orientation (Espinosa, Elizondo,
and Miranda, 2005). Unfortunately, few studies have examined religious
variations in social attitudes or public policy preferences among Hispanic
Americans (for an exception, see Ellison, Echevarrı́a, and Smith, 2005), and
we are aware of no large-scale systematic study of Latino religion and support or opposition toward SSM in particular.
Our study addresses this important gap in the research literature. We
begin by reviewing literature on contemporary Latino religion in the United
States, and developing several hypotheses about the ways denominational
affiliation and religious participation may bear on attitudes toward SSM.

We then discuss several more specific religious factors that may mediate
these patterns, including: (1) scriptural beliefs; (2) clergy cues; and (3) the
role of religious faith in shaping political views. These issues are then examined empirically using data on a large (N 5 4,016) nation wide sample of
U.S. Latinos collected by the Pew Hispanic Forum in 2006. After presenting
the results, we discuss the implications of key findings for the ongoing
debates over SSM and LGBT equality, and for our understanding of Latino
religion and politics more broadly. Study limitations are noted, and several
promising directions for additional inquiry are identified.
Theoretical and Empirical Background

Denominational Differences in SSM Attitudes
Although precise estimates remain elusive, one prominent survey found
that approximately 70 percent of U.S. Hispanics identify with Catholicism,
while 23 percent identify themselves as Protestant, with the vast majority of
Latino Protestants endorsing conservative (i.e., fundamentalist, evangelical,
and charismatic) variants (Espinosa, Elizondo, and Miranda, 2005). By
contrast, only a small percentage of Latinos eschew identification with organized religion altogether. Thus, most Latinos have at least nominal ties
with faith communities that have embraced highly traditional views on
issues regarding marriage, sexual ethics, and other facets of family life. Such
patterns might suggest that U.S. Latinos will tend to oppose progressive
policy preferences in these areas, such as SSM.
Catholicism is often assumed to serve as a bastion of cultural conservatism
among Latinos in the United States and elsewhere. Indeed, there is some
evidence that observant Latino Catholics, that is, those who attend Mass
regularly, tend to oppose abortion and hew closely to other Catholic teachings,
especially regarding the family and the sanctity of human life. The Vatican has
made its position on SSM quite clear in a recent decree, ‘‘Considerations
Regarding Proposals to Give Legal Recognition to Unions Between Homosexual Persons.’’ Three points from the document are especially noteworthy.
(1) Homosexuality is a troubling moral and social phenomenon . . . (2) The
Church’s teaching on marriage and on the complementarity of the sexes
reiterates a truth that is evident to right reason and recognized as such by all
of the major cultures in the world. (3) No ideology can erase from the
human spirit the certainty that marriage exists solely between a man and a
woman, who by mutual personal gift, proper and exclusive to themselves,
tend toward the communion of their persons. In this way, they mutually
perfect each other, in order to cooperate with God in the procreation and
upbringing of new human lives. (Vatican, 2003)

However, although official church teachings regarding homosexuality and
same-sex marriage are highly conservative, several caveats are in order. First,

despite the unequivocal nature of this Vatican statement, Boswell (1980,
1994) has contended that during earlier historical periods, the church did
perform ceremonies recognizing SSMs. Second, in the post Vatican II era,
lay non-Hispanic white Catholics have been increasingly inclined to disregard some elements of church teaching, valorizing individual conscience as
the arbiter of spiritual truth and social policy. This has led to significant
liberalization on some social attitudes during the past two decades (Hoffmann and Mills, 2005), and overall Catholics tend to express greater openness to SSM than most other religious groups (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison,
2006). Progressive Catholics have tended to stress the gracious, communitarian thrust of Catholic social teaching over the focus on individual moral
and sexual deportment that has been reemphasized by the Vatican in recent
years (D’Antonio, 2007; Dillon, 1999).
There are also signs that for some Latinos, Catholic identity is closely
linked with ethnic identity. For such persons, being Catholic is simply part
of what it means to be Latino, Puerto Rican, Mexican American, or part
of another Spanish-speaking, predominantly Catholic racial/ethnic group
(Dolan and Deck, 1994; Maldonado, 2002; Roof and Manning, 1994). Yet
many of these self-identified Catholics are not regular attendees at Mass, and
may be unaware of—or uninterested in—official policies of the Catholic
Church. Indeed, for many Latinos, Catholicism may be expressed through a
vibrant popular devotional practice that includes combinations of folk beliefs, and spiritual cognitions and practices (e.g., veneration of saints and the
Virgin of Guadalupe), rather than rigid adherence to Catholic doctrines
(Dolan and Deck, 1994; Leon, 2004; Matovina, 2005). It is not clear how
or whether such Catholic identity may influence individuals’ views concerning same-sex marriage. Thus, it may be appropriate to distinguish between (1) devout, that is, regularly attending Catholics and (2) those who
attend Mass sporadically or not at all. Previous work reveals divergent
abortion attitudes between these segments of the Latino Catholic population
(Ellison, Echevarrı́a, and Smith, 2005).
As we noted, the ranks of Protestants have grown among Latinos in the
United States and, indeed, throughout the Americas (Freston, 2001;
Steigenga and Cleary, 2007). Although there is a dearth of reliable data on
Protestant growth among U.S. Latinos, some evidence comes via the Latino
National Political Survey (Diaz-Stevens and Stevens-Arroyo, 1998; Ellison,
Echevarrı́a, and Smith, 2005; Jones-Correa and Leal, 2001) and from the
NORC General Social Surveys (Hunt, 1999), although the GSS typically
yields only a small and unrepresentative sample of U.S. Latinos in any given
year of the survey. Within the general population, conservative Protestant
leaders, denominations, and parachurch ministries have been among the
most visible and outspoken proponents of traditional marital and sexual
norms, and have vociferously opposed same-sex marriage. For many members of these faith communities, heterosexual marriage is understood as a
fundamental mechanism for procreation that is regarded as biblically

ordained (e.g., Genesis 2:23–24). These adherents often worry that marriage
as a social institution faces a crisis due to secularism, liberalism, and a ‘‘gay
agenda’’ that seeks to relativize traditional family norms and values. Conservative Protestants also distinguish sharply between appropriate versus inappropriate forms of sexual behavior, and scriptural references legitimating
heterosexual marriage and disparaging homosexuality are often cited to
support an anti-SSM platform (Grenz, 1997; Welch, 2000).
In addition, on average, conservative Protestants are less likely to believe
that homosexuality is caused by genetic or other biological factors, and more
prone to believe that it is a sinful lifestyle choice (Haider-Markel and Joslyn,
2008; Whitehead, 2010). This distinction is important because such attributions are the strongest single predictor of attitudes toward gay rights,
including same-sex unions, in many previous studies (Herek and Capitanio,
1995; Wood and Bartkowski, 2004). Thus, beliefs about the etiology of
homosexuality may help explain denominational differences in policy preferences, although most studies find that religious factors are independent
predictors of attitudes toward same-sex unions even when attributions are
taken into account (Wood and Bartkowski, 2004; Haider-Markel and
Joslyn, 2008; Whitehead, 2010). One possible reason for this is the distinction between genetic tendencies and sexual behavior; evangelical theologians emphasize that regardless of one’s sexual orientation and its origin,
one has free will to exercise moral choices when deciding whether to engage
in homosexual conduct (e.g., Schmidt, 1995; Welch, 2000). From this
perspective, the reason for conservative Protestant opposition to same-sex
unions is more complex than simply a difference of opinion about the
etiology of homosexuality.
Moreover, many conservative Protestants embrace a vision of U.S. ‘‘civil
religion’’ that calls them to translate their moral values into public policy
(Wilcox and Larson, 2006; Wuthnow, 1988). Briefly, influenced by America’s early Puritan heritage, they see the United States as an exceptional
nation that—from its very inception—was founded on ideals of religious
freedom, and has enjoyed a special covenantal relationship with God. They
argue that God has blessed the United States with unprecedented power,
prosperity, and liberty, but that the failure to enact divinely ordained principles in our social order and legal system places America’s special bond with
God in jeopardy. Thus, viewed from this perspective, laws that support
biblical principles, including those that preserve the primacy of traditional
heterosexual family forms and ideals, are essential for the well-being of the
entire nation, lest God’s blessings be threatened (Burdette, Ellison, and Hill,
2005; Sherkat and Ellison, 1997).
Although many prominent opponents of same-sex marriage are drawn
from the ranks of non-Hispanic white conservative Protestant leaders, they
are increasingly joined by minority evangelicals. The 2008 California campaign over Proposition 8 revealed a deep reservoir of opposition toward
SSM among African Americans, who voted overwhelmingly in favor of

Proposition 8. Recent research confirms this sentiment, and suggests that at
least part of this pattern can be due to the strength of conservative Protestant
values within the black community (Sherkat, de Vries, and Creek, 2010).
During the past year, some Latino evangelicals have joined them, an effort
that has been spearheaded by the National Hispanic Leadership Conference,
under the direction of Reverend Samuel Rodriguez. Interestingly, the rationale for Latino Protestant mobilization against SSM has struck a somewhat different tone than the campaigns led by many predominantly white
groups (NHCLC, 2006). According to the NHCLC, this is ‘‘not about
being anti-gay or discriminating against anyone . . . The primary deterrent in
the Latino community to drug abuse, gang violence, teenage pregnancy, and
other social ills is faith in God and a family with both a mother and a
father.’’ NHCLC materials also pointedly note that some members of their
coalition marched with Dr. Martin Luther King and have participated in
other progressive social causes (NHCLC, 2007). In this way, Latino evangelicals interpret anti-SSM policies as an extension of their progressive,
community-oriented agenda. These patterns align closely with other recent
studies illustrating the strong socially conservative leanings of Latino evangelicals (Ellison, Echevarrı́a, and Smith, 2005).
To date, rather little is known about other faith communities among
Latino Americans. First, a small percentage of Hispanics report ties to
mainline Protestant bodies, such as the Methodist, Presbyterian, and Episcopal churches. However, in the general population, the members of mainline denominations are much more progressive on many social issues than
other religious Americans, including Catholics (Hoffmann and Mills, 2005;
Reimer and Park, 2001). Some, but not all, of this pattern reflects the
comparatively high SES, urban and northeastern residence, and other demographic characteristics of mainline Protestants (Reimer and Park, 2001);
however, studies of electoral trends show that mainline Protestants have
been moving in a more liberal political direction—in individual attitudes
and voting behavior, and in terms of institutional policy orientations—since
the 1960s (Manza and Brooks, 1999). Mainline Protestant discourse has
generally reflected greater openness toward same-sex marriage than the discourse found in other denominations (Cadge, 2002; Olson and Cadge,
2002). Second, a very modest percentage of Latinos belong to sectarian, neoProtestant groups such as the Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Mormons (or
Latter Day Saints), among others. Although these groups endorse some
doctrines that are not accepted by mainstream conservative Protestant
churches, their views on many social issues are staunchly conservative, and
this is certainly the case with regard to SSM. Indeed, the LDS Church
devoted considerable financial and organizational resources to groups backing California’s Proposition 8, which is consistent with official church doctrine, and with a long tradition of supporting traditional marital and family
arrangements (LDS, 2008). Finally, in the general population, secularists
(i.e., persons with no religious preference at all) are the most supportive of

SSM (Olson, Cadge, and Harrison, 2006). Although this segment of the
Latino population is quite limited—smaller than in the overall U.S. population (Cavalcanti and Schleef, 2005)—they tend to be more supportive of
abortion rights than most other Hispanics (Ellison, Echevarrı́a, and Smith,
2005). We anticipate a similar pattern with respect to SSM.
Bible Beliefs, Clergy Cues, and Religious Politicization
Although it is not possible to adjudicate among all the potential explanations for religious groups’ varying attitudes toward SSM, our study takes a
significant step in this direction by focusing on three promising candidates:
(1) scriptural interpretations; (2) clergy political cues; and (3) the politicization of religious faith. First, it is possible that conservative Protestant
tendencies to reject SSM may be partly bound up with distinctive approaches to the interpretation of biblical scriptures. Briefly, in the general
population, fundamentalists and evangelicals are disproportionately likely to
endorse the view that the Bible is the Word of God, inerrant and authoritative over all spheres of human activity (Boone, 1989; Hempel and Bartkowski, 2008). Significant percentages go a step further, claiming that the
Bible should be interpreted literally, word for word. In practice, the meanings of labels like ‘‘inerrantist’’ and ‘‘literalist’’ are not always clear. Many
observers believe that they are ‘‘markers’’ of identification with specific religious and political communities, rather than actual interpretive postures;
individuals may adopt the label first, based on the teachings of church
leaders and lay elites, and subsequently apply the label to concrete problems
and issues based on meanings disseminated among local clergy and congregations (Malley, 2004).
For persons who regard the Bible as the yardstick for determining truth in
all human affairs, especially those involving faith, morality, and family life,
this may be quite important. Although scriptural treatments of these issues
are highly contested (Helminiak, 2000), anti-SSM forces have emphasized a
handful of scriptural passages that seem to disparage homosexuality (e.g.,
Leviticus 18:22, 20:13; Romans 1:26–27), in order to justify their view that
LGBT lifestyles are immoral and that redefining marriage to accommodate
SSM is biblically and socially unsound. Scripture is also used to support the
view that the origin of homosexuality is internal and spiritual, the result of
sinful tendencies (Mark 7:21–23), rather than due to genetics, social environment, or other factors. Although recent studies show that links between
religious beliefs and social and political attitudes are moderated by race and
ethnicity (Cohen et al., 2009; McDaniel and Ellison, 2008), in the general
U.S. population, biblical inerrancy and/or literalism helps explain part of the
link between conservative Protestant affiliation and support for traditional
‘‘pro-family’’ values (Burdette, Ellison, and Hill, 2005; Sherkat and Ellison,
1997). Given the centrality of biblical arguments in the rhetoric of Latino

evangelical opponents of SSM, it is reasonable to expect a similar pattern
among U.S. Hispanics.1
After a long period of neglect, researchers are once again showing interest
in the role of clergy in shaping the political orientations of parishioners
(Smidt, 2004). Priests and pastors influence politics in a number of different
ways that may include determining congregational policies; political outreach strategies and programs, as well as providing political information,
framing public issues, and spurring mobilization among their flocks. To
date, only a few studies have examined these issues among Latinos, and they
confirm that clergy are as active in these ways as other Latino community
leaders, such as media or business elites, and that Catholic priests and
evangelical Protestant pastors are both engaged in encouraging political engagement among laypersons (Espinosa, Elizondo, and Miranda, 2005).
Studies conducted in the general U.S. Catholic population show that priests
tend to be more politically knowledgeable and sophisticated than their parishioners and they suggest that clergy cues can have an impact on lay
decision making (Smith, 2005). Among conservative Protestants, and to a
certain extent other traditions, pastors hold positions of honor and status,
and devout members are likely to respect their efforts to (1) relate scripture
to personal and civic life and (2) apply biblical principles to political debates.
Thus, sermons or other pastoral communication on key public policy issues
may trigger significant mobilization among active members. Further, we
anticipate that most clergy who articulate positions on SSM—especially
among Catholic and conservative Protestant clergy members, and perhaps
less so among mainline Protestant ministers—will express opposition rather
than support. Such clergy cues may help explain any observed effects of
denomination and/or participation levels on attitudes concerning SSM.
Finally, individuals may also vary in the extent to which they integrate
religion and politics, that is, the degree to which their political views are
influenced by their faith commitments. This issue has been woefully understudied with respect to U.S. Latinos. Within the general population,
however, some observers have called attention to two important points: (1)
religious traditions have long differed in the extent to which they have
favored a public role for religious leaders and discourse; and (2) there has
been a pronounced shift in these patterns over the past 20–30 years. Although mainline Protestants have long claimed a more visible presence in
the public sphere, Regnerus and Smith (1998) have shown that evangelical
1
On June 15, 2008, the popular Univision television show Al Punto (hosted by Jorge
Ramos) hosted a debate between Reverend Sam Rodriguez, a prominent Latino evangelical
opponent of SSM, and Reverend Ignacio Castuera, a Latino Methodist (mainline Protestant)
who supports the rights of LGBT persons to marry. Consistent with the arguments articulated here, Rodriguez contended: ‘‘the scripture presents us with the model of what is a
family and God’s plan—man and woman.’’ By contrast, Castuera countered: ‘‘The Bible has
many different models of sexuality and many different models of family . . . [and in any case]
we cannot impose the Bible as the right belief onto a population with people who are
multicultural and religiously diverse.’’

Protestants are now much more likely to agree that religion should have a
place in public debates about education, politics, and other public matters,
while mainline Protestants—along with nominal Catholics and secularists—
have become ardent advocates of privatism. In light of this ‘‘selective
deprivatization,’’ we expect that conservative Protestants may be especially
prone to integrate religion into their political thinking, a tendency that may
help explain their disproportionate opposition to SSM.
Data and Measures

Data
To explore these issues, we analyze data from a nation wide probability
sample of Latinos, that is, persons of Latino background or descent, 18 years
of age or older residing in the United States. This CATI-assisted telephone
survey was executed by ICR, Inc. of Media, PA on behalf of the Pew
Hispanic Center and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life. Interviews were conducted in English or Spanish, according to the preference of
the respondent, between August 10 and October 4, 2006 (for an extensive
description of sampling and weighting procedures, see Survey Methodology,
2009). These procedures yielded a total sample of 4,016 Latino respondents,
with a margin of error of 2.5 percent with a 95 percent confidence interval.
This data set is uniquely appropriate for our study due to (1) the large N, (2)
the substantial diversity of national-origin groups and presence of large
numbers of immigrants, and (3) the rich and detailed array of items tapping
religious affiliation, practice, and belief, as well as (4) a range of items
gauging attitudes on important contemporary public policy issues.
Dependent Variable
Support for same-sex marriage was measured via responses to the following question: ‘‘All in all, do you favor or oppose allowing gays and lesbians
to marry legally?’’ Answers were coded 1 5 favor, 0 5 oppose. Approximately 65 percent of these respondents expressed opposition to same-sex
marriage.
Religious Variables
Respondents were queried about their religious affiliation via the following item: ‘‘What is your religion—Catholic, Evangelical or Protestant
Christian, Jehovah’s Witness, Mormon, Jewish, Muslim, or orthodox
church such as the Greek or Russian Orthodox Church?’’ Those indicating

Protestant affiliation were then asked to specify their church from a list of 22
Protestant denominations, and were also given an opportunity to specify a
different Protestant church. Responses to these items were then recoded into
the following categories, based on the RELTRAD classification scheme
proposed by Steensland et al. (2000): Catholic, evangelical, mainline Protestant, other Christian, non-Christian religion, and no religion. Individuals
who declined to answer the item(s) on affiliation (n 5 173) and those affiliated with non-Christian faiths (n 5 76) were too few in number to permit
meaningful analyses and thus were dropped from the subsequent analyses.
Respondents were also asked: ‘‘Aside from weddings and funerals how
often do you attend religious services . . . more than once a week, once a
week, once or twice a month, a few times a year, seldom, or never?’’ In our
analyses, we distinguished between regularly attending versus other members
of each of the major denominational categories, yielding the following
dummy variables: evangelical, regularly attending ( 5 1); evangelical, not
regularly attending ( 5 1); mainline Protestant, regularly attending ( 5 1);
mainline Protestant, not regularly attending ( 5 1); Catholic, not regularly
attending ( 5 1); other Christian ( 5 1); and no religion ( 5 1). In our
multivariate models, each of these categories was compared with the reference group, regularly attending Catholics ( 5 0). Note that we were unable
to distinguish among attendance groups for the other Christian (mainly
sectarian) category because (1) the base category is small and (2) most of
these persons attend services at least once per week.
Several additional religious variables were also incorporated into our analyses. First, respondents were asked about the role of religion in shaping
their political orientations: ‘‘Generally speaking, how important are your
religious beliefs in influencing your political thinking?’’ Using responses to
this item, we created dummy variables for the following responses: very
important ( 5 1); somewhat important ( 5 1); and not too important ( 5 1).
In addition, based on the results of preliminary analyses, we included a
dummy variable to identify those respondents who do not know or refused
( 5 1). Persons in each of these categories were compared with respondents
who indicated that religion is not at all important ( 5 0) in shaping their
political views. Second, the Pew survey contains a single question asking
respondents to indicate which of three statements about the Bible comes
closest to describing their views. The wording of this item is similar to the
wording of a popular item in the NORC General Social Surveys. In light of
numerous studies linking biblical literalism with conservative political views
and activities, we created a dummy variable to identify those individuals
who indicated: ‘‘The Bible is the actual word of God and is to be taken
literally, word for word.’’ Finally, respondents who reported attending religious services were asked: ‘‘On another subject, does the clergy at your
place of worship ever speak out about . . . laws regarding homosexuality?’’
Persons answering affirmatively were identified with a dummy variable
(1 5 yes, 0 5 no).

Control Variables
Our multivariate models also controlled for a number of potentially
confounding factors that may be linked with both religion and attitudes
concerning same-sex marriage. Thus, we incorporate statistical adjustments
for gender (1 5 female, 0 5 male); age/cohort (1 5 under 30 years old,
1 5 60 or older vs. 0 5 ages 30–59); specific Hispanic background
(1 5 Puerto Rican vs. 0 5 all others);2 marital status (1 5 never married,
1 5 divorced or separated vs. 0 5 married or widowed); educational attainment (1 5 less than high school diploma, 1 5 some college, 1 5 college
degree, 1 5 graduate school vs. 0 5 high school diploma or some vocational
training); family income (1 5 under 15K, 1 5 15K–29.99K vs. 0 5 all others); nativity status/time in the United States (1 5 immigrant, 15 years or
more vs. 0 5 all others);3 community type (1 5 rural, 0 5 all others).
Finally, we controlled for self-described political ideology (1 5 conservative
or very conservative vs. 0 5 moderate, liberal, or very liberal). Based on the
results of preliminary analyses, we also included a dummy variable for persons who did not know or refused to answer this item ( 5 1).

Results

We estimate a series of logistic regression models, gauging the net effects
of religious variables and other predictors on the odds of supporting samesex marriage. Findings from these models, which are based on weighted
data, are displayed in Table 1. We begin with a baseline model, which
includes only the nonreligious predictors of attitudes regarding same-sex
marriage. Next we add dummy variables tapping affiliation/attendance
groupings in Model 2. Given the prevalence of Catholicism within most
Latino subgroups, these analyses treat devout or regularly attending Catholics as the reference category, with which all other affiliation/attendance
groupings are compared. Then we estimate a full model (Model 3), adding
potential mediating variables, such as the importance of religion in shaping
2

The Pew Hispanic sample is quite diverse in terms of specific national-origin groups, with
unweighted percentages as follows: Puerto Rican, 8.8 percent; Cuban, 4.4 percent; Dominican, 2.3 percent; Central American, 9.5 percent; South American, 7.7 percent; other Hispanic, 2.5 percent; Mexican, 64.7 percent. In our preliminary analyses (not shown), only
Puerto Ricans held distinctive attitudes concerning SSM; they were much more open to SSM
than the remaining Latino national-origin groups. Therefore, we retain a single dummy
variable identifying Puerto Ricans in the subsequent analyses.
3
In preliminary analyses (not shown), we gave careful attention to the associations involving (1) nativity status and (2) length of time in the United States for immigrants.
However, the only clear pattern that surfaced in the data involved the tendency of immigrants
with 151years’ residence in the United States; respondents in this category were notably less
supportive of SSM than all other Latinos. Therefore, our analyses retain a single dummy
variable identifying these persons.

TABLE 1
Estimated Net Effects of Religious Variables and Covariates on Support for
Same-Sex Marriage, Logistic Regression Odds Ratios, N 5 3,255 (2007
Hispanic Religion Survey)
Model 1
Evangelical Protestant
Regularly attending
Not regularly attending
Mainline Protestant
Regularly attending
Not regularly attending
Catholic
Regularly attending (ref. cat.)
Not regularly attending
Other Christian
No Religion
Religion Shaping Political Views
Very important
Somewhat important
Not too important
Not important at all (ref. cat.)
Don’t know/refused
Clergy Speak Out on Homosexuality
Yes
No (ref. cat.)
Biblical Literalist
Yes
No (ref. cat.)
Gender
Female
Male (ref. cat.)
Age
Under 30
60 years or older
30–59 (ref. cat.)
Puerto Rican
Yes
No (ref. cat.)
Marital Status
Never married
Divorced/separated
All others (ref. cat.)
Education
Less than high school
High school or vocational (ref. cat.)
Some college
College degree
Graduate school

Model 2

Model 3

—
—

0.16 n n n
0.29 n n n

0.20 n n n
0.32 n n n

—
—

0.491
2.10 n n

0.47 n
1.79 n

—
—
—
—

1.00
1.33 n n
0.21 n n n
2.67 n n n

1.00
1.11
0.18 n n n
1.88 n n n

—
—
—
—
—

—
—
—
—
—

0.47 n n n
0.55 n n n
0.71 n
1.00
0.26 n n n

—
—

—
—

0.69 n n n
1.00

—
—

—
—

0.68 n n n
1.00

1.35 n n n
1.00

1.57 n n n
1.00

1.64 n n n
1.00

1.47 n n n
0.35 n n n
1.00

1.49 n n n
0.35 n n n
1.00

1.40 n n n
0.31 n n n
1.00

1.66 n n n
1.00

2.14 n n n
1.00

2.10 n n n
1.00

1.53 n n n
1.36 n n n
1.00

1.33 n n
1.28 n
1.00

1.31 n
1.241
1.00

0.82 n
1.00
1.36 n n
1.62 n n
2.24 n n

0.76 n n
1.00
1.39 n n
1.53 n n
1.91 n

0.76 n n
1.00
1.20
1.28
1.56

TABLE 1—continued

Family Income
Under 15K
15K–29.99K
All others (ref. cat.)
Nativity/Time in U.S.
Migrated, 15 or more years ago
All others
Rural Residence
Yes
No (ref. cat.)
Political Ideology
Conservative
Don’t know/refused
Moderate or liberal (ref. cat.)
Model  2 (Wald)
df
 2 log likelihood

Model 1

Model 2

Model 3

1.12
1.17
1.00

1.14
1.17
1.00

1.241
1.31 n
1.00

0.70 n n n
1.00

0.68 n n n
1.00

0.68 n n n
1.00

0.38 n n n
1.00

0.36 n n n
1.00

0.38 n n n
1.00

0.46 n n n
1.23
1.00
336.87
16
3866.16

0.54 n n n
1.37 n
1.00
494.29
23
3567.39

0.57 n n n
1.49 n n
1.00
547.20
29
3471.15

po0.001; n npo0.01; npo0.0.
NOTE: Reference category is marked (ref. cat.).
nnn

political views, biblical literalism, and clergy outspokenness on laws concerning homosexuality. Cell entries displayed in Table 1 are odds ratios.
Several sets of findings are particularly noteworthy. The multivariate
findings confirm that evangelical Protestant Latinos are much more resistant
to same-sex marriage than their Catholic counterparts. According to the
estimates in Model 2, the odds of approving of same-sex marriage are 84
percent lower among evangelicals who attend services regularly (OR 5 0.16,
po0.001), and 71 percent lower for evangelicals who attend less often
(OR 5 0.29, po0.001), compared to devout Catholics from otherwise
similar backgrounds. The odds of supporting same-sex marriage are nearly
80 percent lower (OR 5 0.21, po0.001) for the members of other, mostly
sectarian Christian groups compared to regularly attending Catholics.
Mainline Protestants who attend services regularly are much less likely
(OR 5 0.49, po0.10) than their devout Catholic counterparts to endorse
same-sex marriage. On the other hand, several segments of the Latino religious population are significantly more supportive of same-sex marriage, as
compared with Catholics who attend Mass on a regular basis. These specific
groups include: secular Latinos (OR 5 2.67, po0.001) and mainline Protestants who are not weekly church attenders (OR 5 2.10, po0.01), as well
as less-devout Catholics (OR 5 1.33, po0.01).
As expected, other religious factors are robust independent predictors of
attitudes toward marriage rights for gays and lesbians. First, Latinos for
whom religion is very important or somewhat important in shaping political

thinking are much less likely (OR 5 0.47, po0.001 and OR 5 0.55,
po0.001, respectively) to favor same-sex marriage as compared with those
for whom religious influence on political views is not important at all. Even
those persons for whom religion is not too important are somewhat less
supportive (OR 5 0.71, po0.05). Further, the small group of respondents
who were unable or unwilling to respond to this question about the role of
religion in their political judgments express the strongest opposition to
same-sex marriage (OR 5 0.26, po0.001). Second, the odds of endorsing
same-sex marriage are roughly 30 percent lower (OR 5 0.69, po0.001)
among respondents who attend congregations in which the clergy member
has spoken out about laws governing homosexuality than among other
persons. Third, the odds of approving of same-sex marriage are also approximately one-third lower (OR 5 0.68, po0.001) for Latinos who embrace the view that the Bible is the literal Word of God, as compared with
those who hold less conservative interpretive postures regarding scripture.
Although it is reasonable to anticipate that controlling for these additional
religious variables would mediate or reduce the estimated net gaps among the
affiliation/attendance groupings reported in Model 2 of Table 1, for the most
part these differences persisted despite these controls. Indeed, the patterns
involving evangelical Protestants and sectarian Christians changed only trivially in Model 3. The net difference between secular Latinos and devout
Catholics was reduced by roughly one-third in Model 3, but the odds of
approving same-sex marriage were still nearly twice as high among secular
Latinos (OR 5 1.88, po0.001). The only meaningful change in affiliation/
attendance effects involved the estimated net difference between devout
Catholics and other Catholics, which was reduced to statistical insignificance
(OR 5 1.11, ns) with controls for the additional religious variables.
In ancillary analyses (not shown), we explored which of the possible
mediators is most clearly responsible for attenuating the estimated net
difference between devout and nondevout Catholics. The results indicated
that Catholics who do not attend Mass regularly are significantly less inclined to integrate religion into their political thinking, and that controls for
this variable alone nearly eliminated the estimated net difference in SSM
attitudes versus their devout counterparts. Comparable models involving
biblical literalism and exposure to clergy political cues did not show this
mediating effect.4
4

Unfortunately, the Pew item on clergy political cues does not specifically indicate whether
the respondent’s clergy tend to favor or oppose SSM. However, it seems unlikely that very
many Latino clergy are outspoken advocates of SSM for two reasons. (1) Given the strong
opposition in the Latino population, which is greater than in the overall U.S. population,
clergy could risk significant backlash from congregants. (2) Even Latino clergy from mainline
Protestant denominations—typically the most sympathetic segment of the religious spectrum
(Cadge, 2002; Olson and Cadge, 2002)—have expressed opposition. In one example, as
ELCA Lutherans geared up to debate liberalizing their official position on SSM in 2009, a
group of Hispanic Lutheran clergy issued a strongly worded letter urging rejection of these
proposals (Kwon, 2009). In ancillary analyses (not shown), we also added cross-product

Estimated Net Effects of Control Variables
Given the dearth of information about the social patterning of Latino
opinion on same-sex marriage, we also note several findings involving covariates. Among Hispanics in the United States, women are more sympathetic toward this issue than are men, and this gap widens when gender
differences in religious involvement are controlled. Age/cohort differences
are quite large; Latinos under age 30 are relatively supportive of same-sex
marriage as compared with their counterparts aged 30–59, while Latino
seniors express strong opposition to this practice. Puerto Ricans are markedly more tolerant of same-sex marriage than members of other Latino
nationality groups, and this Puerto Rican distinctiveness is strengthened
with controls for religiousness. We also find a moderate association between
marital status and attitudes on this issue, with never-married Latinos reporting greater approval. Initial models revealed a sharp educational gradient
in opinion on same-sex marriage, but most education differences disappeared with controls for religious variables, although persons with less than a
high school diploma remain less supportive of same-sex marriage than their
counterparts with high school or vocational credentials. There is little variation in opinion toward this issue by family income. Latino immigrants with
at least 15 years’ residence in the United States appear notably more reluctant to support same-sex marriage than either native-born Latinos or
more recent immigrants. Finally, approval of marriage rights for gays and
lesbians is much lower among rural Latinos than among their urban or
suburban counterparts, and among self-described conservatives as compared
with politically moderate or liberal Latinos. In an interesting twist, with the
introduction of controls for indicators of religious involvement, Latinos who
were unable or unwilling to characterize their political views along a conservative-liberal continuum were actually more tolerant of same-sex marriage
than their moderate or liberal counterparts.

Discussion

One aim of this study has been to augment the limited body of research
on religion and Latino public opinion. Although numerous studies have
linked religious affiliation, practice, and belief with policy-related attitudes
and practices in the general population, the literature on these issues among
Hispanics is remarkably thin. Our work focuses on attitudes toward sameinteraction terms to Model 3 of Table 1 to investigate: (1) whether the estimated net effects
of clergy cues on SSM attitudes are stronger among the more frequent church attenders, and
(2) whether they vary across denominational lines. No evidence of such contingent relationships surfaced, save a marginally significant finding that regularly attending evangelicals
are somewhat more opposed to SSM (b 5  0.764, p 5 0.066) if their pastor has spoken out
on issues relating to homosexuality.

sex marriage (SSM), using data from a large nation wide probability sample
of U.S. Latinos conducted by the Pew Hispanic Forum. We also go beyond
the standard religious predictors of social attitudes, examining the possible
roles of religious (de)privatization, clergy political cues, and other potential
mediators of group differentials in SSM attitudes. Several sets of findings
deserve emphasis.
First, despite lingering popular images of Latinos as monolithically Catholic, Protestants now make up roughly one-fourth of the U.S. Hispanic
population, and the vast majority of these Protestants are conservative, that
is, fundamentalist, evangelical, or charismatic. This heterogeneity has given
rise to substantial religious divisions in attitudes toward same-sex marriage,
and these religious cleavages are at least as large in magnitude as those in the
overall U.S. population. Specifically, members of conservative Protestant
denominations and sectarian (i.e., neo-Protestant) groups such as the Mormons are almost uniformly opposed to SSM. Interestingly, the distinctive
patterns of conservative Protestants are not contingent on the frequency of
attendance at services; that is, sporadic attenders are almost as likely to
oppose SSM as regular attenders. Second, despite common assumptions that
Latino Catholics embrace conservative social values, and that Catholicism
influences (or at least reflects) traditional Latino ‘‘family values,’’ Catholics—Latino and otherwise—tend to hold more moderate views of SSM
than conservative Protestants. We find that this is true even of devout Latino
Catholics. Third, opinions of SSM vary widely among mainline Protestants;
among Latinos, as in the general population, sporadic attenders are inclined
to favor SSM, but regularly attending mainline Latinos tend to resist this
idea. Nevertheless, this finding is consistent with the observation of Olson,
Cadge, and Harrison (2006), who remind us that not all religious communities remain implacably opposed to SSM, although within religious
circles opponents outnumber supporters by a wide margin. Indeed, as in
their study, we find that secular Latinos are much more favorable toward
SSM than others. Over and above denominational differences, we find that
biblical literalists, those who attend congregations in which clergy have been
outspoken about homosexuality, and those who integrate religion into their
political thinking are much more inclined to oppose SSM than are other
respondents. However, although we initially conceived of these factors as
potential mediators of denominational differences, this was largely not the
case. Instead, our measures of Bible beliefs, clergy cues, and religious
(de)privatization accounted for additional shares of variance in SSM attitudes but, with few exceptions, did not ‘‘explain away’’ the observed denominational differentials described above.
Taken together, these findings raise a number of broader interpretive
issues that warrant reflection. First, our results suggest that Latino conservative Protestants and sectarians belong to potent subculture(s), the social
and political significance of which remain poorly understood. It is remarkable that for conservative Protestants, especially, there is little variation in the

strength of anti-SSM sentiment according to the frequency of church attendance. Further, contrary to the thrust of many public opinion studies
conducted within the general (i.e., predominantly non-Hispanic white)
population, these findings are not explained by the disproportionate endorsement of biblical literalism or, for that matter, by clergy cues regarding
family or LGBT issues, or even by the selective deprivatization observed by
Regnerus and Smith (1998). Given the adamant views and strong tendencies, and the apparent growth of this population, as well as its conservatism
on other social issues (e.g., abortion), much more sustained attention from
researchers in multiple disciplines is needed to understand the origins, dynamics, and social composition of Latino evangelicalism.
Due to data limitations, we are unable to examine the role of beliefs about
the causes of homosexuality, which may account for at least part of the
conservative Protestant ‘‘effect’’ on SSM attitudes. In the general population, conservative Protestants and frequent attenders are more likely than
others to believe that homosexuality is a product of human choice rather
than due to genetic or biological influences (Wood and Bartkowski, 2004;
Haider-Markel and Joslyn, 2008; Whitehead, 2010). Another significant
interpretive issue worth considering is the causal ordering of the patterns
observed here. Although religious influences on social attitudes are likely to
be potent, it is also the case that individuals who embrace conservative moral
and family orientations may be especially drawn to join evangelical religious
communities. Thus, it would be helpful to examine the interplay of socialization (i.e., internal mechanisms of spiritual formation and value transmission) and selection (i.e., tendencies and circumstances of conversion) as
contributors to the patterns observed here.
Among Latinos, regularly attending Catholics do tend to oppose SSM, by
a margin of roughly two to one, a pattern that is very close to the mean
figure for the overall U.S. Hispanic population. Less-devout Catholics are
somewhat more amenable to the idea of same-sex marriage, a difference that
is largely due to the greater tendency of their devout counterparts to integrate faith into their political thinking. Thus, it is worth knowing more
about why significant numbers of Catholics engage in this form of
privatization, and who these persons are. For example, are they disaffected
due to church teachings on social issues, do they engage in popular spirituality rather than formal organizational practices, or do they maintain
Catholic identity mainly as an expression or extension of their Latino ethnicity? The answers to these questions may have important implications for
the future of Catholicism among the growing U.S. Hispanic population.
As in the study by Olson, Cadge, and Harrison (2006), we find that as
predictors of SSM attitudes, religious variables perform better than sociodemographic variables. The comparison of religious versus educational
effects is especially remarkable. Education is usually one of the strongest and
most reliable predictors of social policy liberalism in studies of the general
population, yet the inclusion of denominational effects virtually eliminated a

pronounced educational gradient in approval of SSM. Moreover, the inclusion of religious variables in Models 2 and 3 of Table 1 increased the
overall predictive power of the (baseline) model by roughly 65 percent,
obviously a major increment. When political scientists and others conduct
studies of social and political attitudes among U.S. Latinos in the future,
religious factors—including (but ideally not restricted to) denominational
differences—should almost certainly be part of the equation.
Our findings may also have significant political implications for Latinos
and broader U.S. society. Although the role of religion in shaping Latino
political attitudes and behavior has received only limited attention from
researchers (Ellison, Echevarrı́a, and Smith, 2005; Jones-Correa and Leal,
2001), there are welcome signs of ferment and change in this area, and it is
hoped that this study will add momentum to this emerging line of inquiry.
The impetus for such work is also fueled by recent findings that relationships
between religion and politics differ across racial/ethnic lines (Cohen et al.,
2009). One recent study using data from replicated cross-sectional surveys
conducted in the Houston area demonstrates that political implications of
biblical literalism—often a key indicator of conservative Protestant belief—
vary sharply by race and ethnicity. Although non-Hispanic white biblical
literalists moved steadily into the Republican Party during the 1982–2004
period, African-American biblical literalists exhibited little if any shift in
party identification. Importantly, however, while biblical literalist Latinos
did move away from their historic allegiance to the Democratic Party over
this period, they are increasingly likely to self-identify as Independents;
despite their shared cultural values, to date most have not found a natural
home in the GOP (McDaniel and Ellison, 2008). Understanding the political cross-pressures facing Latinos, especially conservative Protestants, due
to the combination of conservative social values and more progressive views
on immigration and pocketbook issues, may shed valuable light on the
future electoral leanings of this important and growing population.
Like all studies, our work is characterized by several limitations in addition
to those noted above. First, the Pew survey contained only a single item on
same-sex marriage, which is dichotomously coded (yes/no). Work by Olson,
Cadge, and Harrison (2006) using data on a general population sample has
shown that individual responses, as well as the relative importance of religious
factors, may depend on the specific wording of the survey item tapping
attitudes regarding SSM, for example, whether the item taps normative views
or support for a constitutional amendment. Thus, we cannot be certain that
our findings would be similar across items that were differently worded.
Given the coding of the Pew measure, we also cannot gauge the strength of
opposition or support among key subgroups, including segments of the
religious public. It would also be useful to know about support for (or at least
acquiescence to) civil unions, as opposed to the use of the term ‘‘marriage’’ to
confer recognition on same-sex unions. Further, although we have made a
contribution to the literature by exploring several variables that might be

expected to mediate the powerful denominational effects observed here, more
could be done. For example, Olson, Cadge, and Harrison (2006) found that
the number of close friendships within the congregation predicted attitudes
on this issue—a notable pattern in light of recent studies indicating that
Catholics are less prone to form friendships at church than are others. It
could also help to know whether respondents are personally acquainted with
any LGBT persons, particularly those in durable unions. One suspects that
the potential for such meaningful interpersonal contact could be especially
low within some conservative religious communities.
Despite its limitations, this study has contributed to the literature in
several ways. We have used large-scale survey data to document major religious gaps in approval of same-sex marriage within the U.S. Latino population. We have explored and reflected on a number of possible
explanations for these sizeable religious differentials, and we have identified several promising directions for further investigation and clarification.
Clearly, the U.S. Latino population is becoming larger and more heterogeneous, and one notable expression of this internal diversity involves its
religious composition, which is in considerable ferment. The growth of
Protestantism, particularly the conservative variants, may have significant
import for the social organization and political life of U.S. Hispanics. Further analyses along the lines sketched above, and others as well, by social
scientists can cast fresh light on these developments and their implications.
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